EXHIBIT 13

MARJORIE FERRELL, et al vs. WYETH-AYERST

Videotaped Deposition of Gary French, Ph.D. - Volume II

October 24, 2002

COURT REPORTERS, ETCetera, INC.

(410) 653-1115 (202) 628-DEPO 1-800-947-DEPO

MARJORIE FERRELL, et al vs. WYETH-AYERST Videotaped Deposition of Gary French, Ph.D. - Volume II

October 24, 2002

Page 521

Page 519

1 my work, so you're asking me questions that I'd

- 2 have to think a lot more about, probably would
- 3 want to do further analysis than just these
- 4 tables that were created for pass-through.
- 5 Q. Let's follow through this hypothetical
- 6 that I have that the price increase on March 1st,
- 7 2000 was anti-competitive and was the first
- 8 anti-competitive price increase of the period.
- 9 When prices were raised again on September 1st of
- 10 2000, I take it that the anti-competitive
- 11 increase that took place on March 1st of 2000
- 12 would have been carried through in the prices
- 13 that existed as of that time, right?
- 14 MR. GUSTAFSON: Object to the form of
- 15 the question.
- 16 Q. Or is that wrong?
- 17 A. I don't know that I can answer the
- 18 question. I mean this is looking at things in a
- 19 very mechanical, strange way. I mean, normally
- 20 to determine whether something is monopolistic or
- 21 higher than a competitive price, you compare the
 - Page 520

1 price to a competitive price, not to the same

- 2 prices as the I don't as I've said, I think
- 3 that Wyeth for decades has had monopoly power, so
- 4 probably every price on this table reflects a
- 5 degree of monopoly power, but you're adding in
- 6 your earlier questions something relating it to
- 7 the claims in this case.
- 8 Q. Right.
- 9 A. And I don't know that I can separate
- 10 that with just this information, so I don't think
- 11 I can answer those questions.
- 12 Q. Assuming that the March 1st, 2000
- 13 price increase reflected some anti-competitive
- 14 component, that some portion or all of it were in
- 15 a competitive -- is it possible that the
- 16 September 1st, 2000 increase would have added an
- 17 additional anti-competitive increment on top of
- 18 the March 1st, 2000 increment?
- 19 MR. GUSTAFSON: Object to the form of
- 20 the question. Incomplete.
- A. I guess it's possible, but it's also

- I true that for reasons that have nothing to do
- 2 with anti-competitive conduct, prices might have
- 3 been going up anyway, so you'd have to look at
- 4 other factors to make sure. I mean you could
- 5 have one price increase that is wholly or 100
- 6 percent monopolistic, no business or economic
- 7 reason for it to go up other than that they have
- 8 the monopoly power to extract it. Then you can
- 9 have another price increase where the only reason
- 10 they increase is because their costs went up by
- 11 that much and that's a legitimate price increase.
- 12 You wouldn't compound the two or add them
- 13 together, but I don't have that kind of
- 14 information to know at this point in the case.
 - Q. So it's not your view necessarily that
- 16 the amount of the anti-competitive overcharge
- 17 would have been greater at the end of the class
- 18 period than it was earlier in the class period?
 - A. No.

19

- 20 MR. GUSTAFSON: Object to the form of
- 21 the question.

Page 522

- A. It's not necessarily my view that that
- 2 would be true. I haven't done the empirical work
- 3 yet to quantify the extent of the overcharge.
- Q. Would it have made sense from an
- 5 economic point of view and have been profit
- 6 maximizing from Wyeth's prospective to take full
- 7 advantage of whatever anti-competitive increase
- 8 it could make based on the elimination of
- 9 Cenestin as a competitor as quickly as possible
- 10 after it had known Cenestin as its competitor?
- MR. GUSTAFSON: Object to the form of the question.
- 3 A. I don't know that that question makes
- 14 sense. It never really had Cenestin as a viable
- 15 competitor. So what happened before Cenestin
- 16 entered and what happened after Cenestin entered
- 17 were pretty similar competitive situations for
- 18 Wyeth because of its own actions.
- 19 Q. So that you wouldn't have expected any
- 20 major differences in pricing patterns for Wyeth
- 21 before and after the conduct alleged in this

MARJORIE FERRELL, et al vs. WYETH-AYERST Videotaped Deposition of Gary French, Ph.D. - Volume II

October 24, 2002

Page 523

I case? Because in your view it was a monopolist

- 2 in both cases and had no viable competitor?
- A. I wouldn't say there would be zero or
- 4 no difference at all, but I wouldn't necessarily
- 5 expect that there would be a difference either.
- 6 It's I haven't studied those questions enough
- 7 to know for sure.
- Q. Let's see. Now, if you look up --
- 9 we're still on Exhibit 4, and you have a -- you
- 10 break out separately cash and third-party prices.
- 11 Why did you do that?
- A. Well, just to see if there was much
- 13 difference between the two segments and there is
- 14 a little bit of difference in terms of the price
- 15 increases and the way the difference goes doesn't
- 16 surprise me.
- 17 Q. Right, that at least for the first --
- 18 well, it's uniformly the case that the percentage
- 19 increase for the cash customers is greater than
- 20 the percentage price increase for the third-party
- 21 customers, right?

- A. That's correct, but here you must
- 2 understand that the third-party price is IMF-1
- 3 mean IMA -- IMS third-party price and it does not
- 4 include the rebate component, so it's not the
- 5 full picture necessarily.
- Q. Right. This is only half a price,
- 7 really?
- A. Well, I don't know about half. It's
- 9 not the full net to third-party price. It's sort
- 10 of a gross price before you subtract rebates and
- 11 the rebates are given quarterly I think for a
- 12 large volume of transactions and it's not obvious
- 13 what they are on a per pill basis unless you do
- 14 some work and have some data to work with which
- 15 presumably will happen later in discovery, but we
- 16 don't have that at this point. That was probably
- 17 one reason for breaking it out to show that where
- 18 you don't have that sort of incompleteness in the
- 19 data, the cash paying price, you can see what's
- 20 happening. It's a little different with the
- 21 third-party price, but some of that -- when you

Page 525

- I look at the rebates, you don't know if the
- 2 percentage -- it might be 4.3 percent if you
- 3 could take the rebates into account, but it might
- 4 not. It's not clear.
- Q. It might be 4.3? It might be 2.9?
- 6 You don't know until you look at it, right?
- A. No, you don't know for sure until you
- 8 look at it and that's part of the reason why I
- 9 showed them separately because one of them is
- 10 very clean, the other one's not so clean.
- Q. So why didn't you attempt to look at
- 12 the information concerning rebates to factor that
- 13 in?
- 14 A. Don't have the discovery yet. Can't
- 15 do it.
- 16 Q. Have you looked through the discovery
- 17 to see whether or not that's in there, that's
- 18 been made available in the Duramed case?
- A. Well, I saw the Wyeth documents and
- 20 there was some data about rebates in there, but I
- 21 didn't think it was comprehensive what I've seen.

Page 524

Page 526

- 1 Maybe it's there and I missed it, but I wouldn't
- 2 want to rely on what was in the Duramed case and
- 3 what kind of came to me secondhand that way. I'd
- 4 want to be able to ask for exactly what I needed
- 5 and be certain that that's what the defendants
- 6 were responding to when they provided the
- 7 information. I don't know what the discovery
- 8 requests were by Duramed.
- Q. That didn't seem to hold you back in
- 10 connection with your first report. You didn't
- 11 ask for any independent documents. You just
- 12 looked at the documents that had been produced in
- 13 the Duramed litigation, right?
- MR. GUSTAFSON: Object to the 14
- 15 question, argumentative.
- A. I was not trying to measure something
- 17 like rebates and I did not use anything analogous
- 18 to that in the first report.
- 19 Q. You looked at pricing data, didn't
- 20 you?
- A. Yeah, pricing data is IMS data. I